Análisis Filosófico

Linguistic Practice, Content and Rationality without Insurance

Eduardo García-Ramírez — 2024-05-07

Faria (2021) offers an extraordinary discussion concerning topics that are rarely treated in relation with each other: change in mental content, its relevance for inferential validity and its consequences for agential responsibility (both in action and thought). Faria’s (2021) goal is to defend that the impermanence of content, the vulnerability of ordinary inferences, the role of luck and the lack of control in our thoughts and actions are inescapable elements of ordinary life. In this paper I will argue that Faria’s arguments are successful, yet I will cast doubt over the specific consequences that Faria draws from them. I will show that, even though there is in fact impermanence, vulnerability and luck, they are not overwhelming and, thus, do not modify our intuitive understanding of contents, beliefs and rationality.

Evaluative Predicates and Context

Federico Javier Jaimes — 2024-05-07

In his most recent book, Cuestiones de Filosofía del Lenguaje: Pragmática, David Pérez Chico (2022) presents a very interesting selection of papers on different topics currently discussed in the philosophy of language. Personally, I consider this book an essential reading for any Spanish-speaking reader who wants to be introduced to the most contemporary discussed topics in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, in the present paper I propose to carry out a critical analysis of four papers in the compilation that deal with the topic of evaluative utterances, i.e., utterances whose extension depends on semantically non-standard contextual parameters.

Ricardo Gómez: In memoriam

María Cristina González — 2024-05-07

Wilfrid Sellars on Social Ontology: Practical Reasoning, Instrumental Connections, and Social Constraint

José Giromini — 2024-05-07

This paper identifies in the works of Wilfrid Sellars two theses that are relevant to the contemporary debate in social ontology. The first one states that we can understand social reality as partially composed of causal or constraining structures. The second states that social reality appears to agents as constituted by constraining structures. The paper defends these interpretative theses by drawing on Sellars’ writings on practical philosophy, and specially on his account of the functioning of hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Moreover, the paper contrasts this causal interpretation with the normative conceptions that prevail both in contemporary social ontology and among Sellars’ followers.

Cooperative Inquiry and Growth as Moral End: The Place of Pluralism within John Dewey´s Idea of Democracy

Livio Mattarollo — 2024-05-07

The aim of this paper is to evaluate Robert Talisse’s criticism to John Dewey’s notion of democracy according to which the latter would be incompatible with rawlsian reasonable pluralism and would become oppressive because it is based on the moral ideal of growth. In order to achieve this goal, Talisse’s objection is reconstructed. Then, Dewey’s main arguments to support democracy —namely, experimentalist and formative arguments— are considered. Ultimately, it is argued that in Dewey’s terms, both ideas of democracy as cooperative social inquiry and growth as moral end give room to pluralism on own right.

Neutral terms used as pejoratives: On a recent proposal by Vicente, Fraser and Castroviejo

Ezequiel Zerbudis — 2024-05-07

I consider the recent proposal by Vicente, Fraser and Castroviejo, according to which there are (at least) two different kinds of pejorative expressions in Spanish, one of which (the one that makes use of neutral terms used as insults) has not been, according to them, sufficiently noticed or studied in the literature. Even if I think that the distinction drawn is important, I suggest an alternative explanation of the phenomenon, according to which the use of these terms as insults has to be understood as metaphoric uses of the terms, and the generic pejorative content they convey has to be understood in terms of general phenomena involved in metaphoric interpretation and presupposition accommodation.

Critical Analysis of the Systematicity Theory from a Coherentist Perspective

Leandro Giri — 2024-05-07

In this paper we will analyse the Systematicity Theory proposed by Paul Hoyningen-Huene from a critical perspective, anchored in coherentism, especially in Mario Bunge's version. The central idea is to present some limits of Hoyningen-Huene's proposal to account for the dynamics of scientific progress and also to observe some difficulties in his analytical tools to demonstrate the pseudo-scientificity of some disciplines of knowledge. It is also intended to point out some complementary ideas that could be used in order to overcome these limits.

A Review of the Notion of Coherence from the Perspective of Logic defined as a Sequence of Notions of Consequence

Matías Daniel Pasqualini — 2024-05-07

In the context of offering alternative logics that deal non-trivially with semantic paradoxes while overcoming the objection of incoherence usually raised against them, the BA-Plan proposes a definition of logic in the sense of an infinite sequence of notions of consequence that specifies validity standards for the inferential level and for the meta-inferential ones. The present work argues that if the convenience of this definition of logic is admitted, it is possible to disentangle the notion of coherence between validity standards from the notion of uniformity between validity standards.

Paraconsistency, Evidence and Semantic Incompleteness

Edson Bezerra — 2024-05-07

In this paper, we argue that the systems Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ) suffer a kind of semantic incompleteness with respect to the informal notion of evidence. More especifically, we argue that the connective o of the logic LETJ fails to validate intuitive principles about conclusive evidence.

Alberto Moretti, En sayos analíticos, Buenos Aires, SADAF, 2020

Manuel García-Carpintero — 2024-05-07

Liza Skidelsky (ed. y comp.), Introducción a la Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas, Uniandes, 2023, 652 pp.

Manuel Epstein — 2024-05-07