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Pragmatismo, ficcionalismo y la construcción de modelos científicos

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  • Nélida Gentile,
  • Susana Lucero
Nélida Gentile
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Susana Lucero
Universidad Nacional de Luján, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1051

Publicado 2025-07-23

Palabras clave

  • Modelos científicos,
  • Pragmatismo metodológico,
  • Pluralismo científico,
  • Relación representacional,
  • Ficcionalismo,
  • Función cognitiva
    • ...Más
    Menos
  • Scientific Models,
  • Methodological Pragmatism,
  • Scientific Pluralism,
  • Representational Relationship,
  • Fictionalism,
  • Cognitive Function
    • ...Más
    Menos
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

En el presente artículo, ofrecemos en primer término una revisión crítica de la concepción pragmática de la ciencia y cómo esta doctrina ha evolucionado hasta la actualidad. En segundo lugar, nos proponemos examinar la relación modelo-target cuyo valor epistémico ha sido cuestionado por algunos defensores de la visión pragmática. Uno de los principales objetivos del trabajo es mostrar que incluir la relación modelo-target en algunos contextos particulares —por ejemplo, en la concepción inferencial de modelos— no es en absoluto incompatible con la visión pragmática. Por otra parte, exploramos la relación entre pragmatismo y ficcionalismo en el contexto de la construcción de modelos. Con respecto a este tópico, rechazamos la posición que hemos denominado “ficcionalismo completo” y asumimos una actitud deflacionaria, “ficcionalismo estrecho”, el cual admite solo una clase de componentes no realísticos de un modelo: los que refieren a entidades no existentes.

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Citas

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