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Realismo Estructural Óntico y el caso del residuo kantiano perdido

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  • Ragnar van der Merwe
Ragnar van der Merwe
Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1202

Publicado 2026-01-27

Palabras clave

  • Ontic Structural Realism,
  • James Ladyman,
  • Epistemic Structural Realism,
  • Kantian Humility,
  • Rae Langton,
  • Noumena
    • ...Más
    Menos
  • Realismo estructural óntico,
  • James Ladyman,
  • Realismo estructural epistémico,
  • Humildad kantiana,
  • Rae Langton,
  • Noúmeno
    • ...Más
    Menos
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Resumen

Como su nombre indica, el Realismo estructural óntico (OSR por sus siglas en inglés) sostiene que la estructura es todo lo que existe. Sin embargo, varios críticos han argumentado que la ontología del OSR es incompleta: debe haber algo ontológicamente significativo más allá de la estructura. Propongo una ontología para atender a esta crítica, una que recurre a lo que Ladyman y Ross denominan “residuo kantiano” (“Kantian residue”). Al hacerlo, modifico la tesis de “humildad kantiana” (“Kantian humility”) de Rae Langton para incorporar “algún x” nouménico extraestructural (como lo formula Kant). Esto implica postular (a) que existe un misterioso algo = x y (b) que ese algo = x es responsable de la estructura (específicamente, de las propiedades no arbitrarias de la estructura). La responsabilidad es una relación modal que podría ser equivalente a alguna relación asimétrica (como la causalidad, la explicación, la determinación, la fundamentación, u otra similar). En cuanto a la naturaleza del “algo = x”, sostengo, en un espíritu deflacionista, que solo podemos saber que es aquello que es responsable de la estructura.

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