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O Argumento do Espelho e a Teoria dos Melhores Sistemas de Leis

Pedro Merlussi
Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
Tobias Marconde
Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.

Publicado 2026-09-12

Cómo citar

Merlussi, P., & Marconde, T. (2026). O Argumento do Espelho e a Teoria dos Melhores Sistemas de Leis. Análisis Filosófico. https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1307

Resumen

Há leis da natureza, e, se sim, o que são? De acordo com a influente teoria de Frank Ramsey e David Lewis, as leis existem e são generalizações que aparecem como axiomas de sistemas dedutivos que combinam da melhor forma simplicidade e força. Apesar de sua influência, uma das principais críticas que a teoria enfrenta é sua suposta incapacidade de mostrar como as leis “suportam” as condicionais contrafactuais. John Carroll apresentou uma das formulações mais precisas e influentes dessa objeção por meio do seu Argumento do Espelho. Neste artigo, apresentamos uma resposta ao Argumento do Espelho ainda inexplorada na literatura; nosso objetivo é mostrar que a teoria de Ramsey e Lewis pode explicar como as leis suportam as contrafactuais se as leis forem entendidas como ceteris paribus.

Citas

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