Published 1997-05-01
How to Cite
Vergara, J. (1997). Cualidades secundarias y autoconocimiento. Análisis Filosófico, 17(1), 5–25. Retrieved from https://www.analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/610
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Abstract
Self-knowledge as a sort ofknowledge can be justified through two kinds of paradigm: obser\vational and inferential. This paper criticizes both epistemic lines and suggests instead that first-person statements exhibit the samc logical structure as statements about secondary qualities, as proposed by Crispin Wright. The paper introduces a variant to this propasa!: self-deception should not be seen as threatening tht: biconditional that expresses that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentionality. This is the constitutive thesis.