Publicado 1997-05-01
Cómo citar
Vergara, J. (1997). Cualidades secundarias y autoconocimiento. Análisis Filosófico, 17(1), 5–25. Recuperado a partir de https://www.analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/610
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Resumen
Self-knowledge as a sort ofknowledge can be justified through two kinds of paradigm: obser\vational and inferential. This paper criticizes both epistemic lines and suggests instead that first-person statements exhibit the samc logical structure as statements about secondary qualities, as proposed by Crispin Wright. The paper introduces a variant to this propasa!: self-deception should not be seen as threatening tht: biconditional that expresses that self-knowledge is constitutive of intentionality. This is the constitutive thesis.